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SYMPOSIUM

THE MILITARY AFTER VIETNAM: THE SEARCH
FOR LEGAL CONTROLS

LEGAL INADEQUACIES AND DOCTRINAL RESTRAINTS
IN CONTROLLING THE MILITARY
EDWARD

F.

SHERMAN t

Legal processes and remedies have not played a significant part
in shaping, managing, and controlling the American military. The
principal legal construct for the role of the military in American
society, the Constitution, provides only collateral and episodic reservations and limitations concerning the armed forces.' The abuses of
the eighteenth century standing army were very much in the minds
of the Founding Fathers, but their solution was the familiar recourse
to separation of powers rather than direct constraints upon the military. The constitutional division of powers, with the President in
effective control of military policy and tactics as Commander in
Chief,2 but with ultimate control in Congress through its powers to
declare war, raise and maintain the armed forces, make rules for
their governance, and appropriate money for their support,3 was
t Professor of Law, Indiana University.

1. Apart from the Commander in Chief clause, art. II,§ 2, ci. 1, and the congressional military powers clauses, art I, § 8, ci. 11-16, the only express references to the
military are found in the second amendment, providing: "A well rigulated militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms,
shall not be infringed;" the third amendment, providing: "No Soldier shall, in time of
peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war,
but in a manner to be prescribed by law," and the fifth amendment exempting from the
right to indictment of a Grand Jury "cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger . .. ."
2. "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service
of the United States . . . ." Art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
3. "The Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War, grant Letters of Marque
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aimed more at preventing either branch from misusing the armed
forces than at controlling the military within its own sphere. Samuel
Huntington maintains that Americans have deluded themselves in the
belief that civilian control of the military is mandated by the Constitution and views the Commander in Chief clause as having little to
do with ensuring civilian control (having served instead as a vehicle
for expansion of presidential power against Congress) and the separation of powers as actually inhibiting objective civilian control.'
The constitutional construct reflects the belief of the Founding
Fathers that military abuses could be curbed by making it more difficult
to enter into war, by limiting federal use of armed forces, and by
diffusing control over the military between the executive and legislative branches. We now know, from the growth of the militaryindustrial establishment since World War II (referred to by Admiral
Hyman G. Rickover as the "fourth branch of government"),' that
these structural limitations are inadequate to control the military.
Indeed, a variety of other legal mechanisms-emanating from administrative law, constitutional guarantees of individual rights, and
criminal procedure-now provide the principal legal constraints upon
the military, although they too sometimes prove inadequate because
of doctrinal and methodological limitations in the legal process.
The military is probably unique among our government bureaucracies in the degree of autonomy accorded it by the three constitutional branches of government. Occupying a special place because the
protection and very survival of the nation is ultimately in its hands,
it has generally been treated with considerable deference by Congress
in its appropriating and regulating role8 and by the executive in its
general supervisory role.7 Viewed as a society necessarily set apart
because of its combat mission and its peculiar need for discipline and
obedience, it has been exempted from ordinary standards of judicial
and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term
than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces . . . ." Art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14.
4. S. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 190-91 (1957).
5. CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., May 1, 1968, at 1063.
6. See generally Congressional Quarterly, The Power of the Pentagon: The Creation, Control and Acceptance of Defense Policy by the U.S. Congress (1972) ; E. KOLODziEJ, THE UNCOMMON DEFENSE AND CONGRESS, 1945-1963 (1966); THE MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT: ITS IMPACTS ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 38-95 (A. Yarmolinsky ed. 1971);

W.

McGAFFIN

& E. KNOLL,

SCANDAL IN THE PENTAGON:

A

CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY

(1969).
7. See generally C. MOLLENHOFF, THE PENTAGON: POLITICS, PROFITS AND PLUNDER

(1967) ; THE

MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT,

supra note 6, at 25-37; Korb, The Secretary of
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review by the courts which have frequently refused to consider cases
involving constitutional disputes over the war and military powers or
to interfere in its internal operations.
Legal science has never been particularly comfortable with legal
issues raised in the military context. The military has generally
operated outside the normal processes of civilian law, and the judiciary
has taken the attitude, expressed by the Supreme Court in 1953, that
"[o]rderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous
not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be
scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters."' Although other
specialized governmental institutions which also claim exemption from
certain constitutional and legal compulsions-such as juvenile courts,
penal institutions, public schools, and mental institutions-have
gradually been drawn into the mainstream of the legal process, the
military has only been touched by a few judicial decisions, primarily
during the Vietnam War. As a result, courts and lawyers often have
a poor understanding of the military, both as to the institutional
processes at work within it and as to the separate system of military
discipline and justice which it maintains. The legal process, which
in this century has assimilated economic theory into antitrust regulation and increasingly into tort and contract law, which has embraced
the methodology of political science and statistics in federal regulatory
law, and which has come routinely to apply sociological and psychological theories to criminal, juvenile, and family law issues, has
given scant attention to social science research and analysis concerning the military.
There is a well-developed body of social science research which is
relevant to the question of controlling the military through legal
mechanisms.9 Thus it is appropriate that this Symposium should
include articles by a sociologist and political scientist and case studies
emphasizing the political and legislative process as well as the legal.
Defense and the Jint Chiefs of Staff: The Budgetary Process, in THE MILITARYINDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: A REASSESSMENT 301-40 (S. Sarkesian ed. 1972).
8. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953).
9. For a chronological development, see, e.g., S. STouFFER, A. LUMSDAINE, M.
LUMSDAINE, R. WILLIAMS, JR., M. SMITH, I. JANIS, S. STAR & L. CoTRE,
JR., THE
AMERICAN SOLDIER: COMBAT AND ITS AFTERMATH (1945); J. SPENCER, CRIME AND THE
SERVICES (1954); A STUDY OF EFFECTIVE AND INEFFECTIVE COMBAT PERFORMERS, SpeC.
Rep. No. 13 (HumRRO Monterey, Cal. 1958); HUNTINGTON, supra note 4; M. JANOWITZ, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER (1960) ; M. JANOWITZ & R. LITTLE, SOCIOLOGY AND THE
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT (1965) ; THE DRAFT (S. Tax ed. 1967) ; THE NEw MILITARY
(M. Janowitz ed. 1967); C. Mosxos, THE AMERICAN ENLISTED MAN: THE RANK AND
FILE IN TODAY'S MILITARY (1970); J. DONOVAN, MILITAISM, U.S.A.* (1970); THE
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, supra note 6; PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MILITARY ESTAB-
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One needs to understand how and why a bureaucracy and its members
function before one can fully assess the propriety or effectiveness of
legal controls, and to know who actually wields the power and how
pressures are brought to bear before judging the impact of controls
through structural circumscriptions. Sociologists and political scientists offer some valuable insights into institutional and individual
behavior and into the functional role of the military within the
political structure which bear directly on such legal issues as deterrence and motivation in military criminal law, the impact which imposition of civilian standards would have upon military effectiveness,
and the degree to which judicial review of particular military determinations is likely to interfere with legitimate functions of a coordinate branch of government.
One of the most valuable uses of social science research to the
law is in providing demonstrable evidence of actual behavior, both
individual and institutional, against which judicial perceptions and
estimates can be compared. Courts are increasingly testing their assumptions in such areas as regulated industries and labor relations
with statistical and analytical data. However, courts still tend to
accept stereotypes in dealing with the military, often based on no other
support than language from prior cases or sketchy historical analysis.
For example, in Parker v. Levy"0 the Supreme Court accepted the
description of the military as a society set apart from civilian life,
with its own standards of honor which all military men appreciate,
to justify the court martial offenses of "conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman" and "conduct to the prejudice of good order and
discipline" against constitutional attack for vagueness and overbreadth.
Despite general agreement today among social scientists that there has
been a gradual convergence of military and civilian social structures
since the Second World War due to such factors as technology and
the bureaucratization of military functions,1 the court relied primarily
upon the historical pedigree of the offenses and upon prior precedents,
mostly from the nineteenth century, that they were both well underLISHMENT (C. Moskos ed. 1971); CONSCIENCE AND COMMAND: JUSTICE AND DISCIPLINE
IN THE MILITARY (J. Finn ed. 1971) ; THE WAR ECONOMY OF THE UNITED STATES (S.
Melman ed. 1971); THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, supra note 7; Special Issue:
Military Sociology, 16 PACIFIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 139 (1973) ; J. LOVLL & P. KaoNENBERG, NEW CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: THE AGONIES OF ADJUSTMENT TO POSTFor reference sources see K. LANG, MILITARY INSTITUVIETNAM REAITIBS (1974).
TIONS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF WAR: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE WITH ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY (1972); JOURNAL OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY SOCIOLOGY.

10. 94 S. Ct. 2547 (1974).
11. See M. JANOWITZ, supra note 9; Biderman & Sharp, The Convergence of Mill-
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stood and necessary to maintain discipline. Justice Stewart's dissent,
although without citing the supporting social science material, observed that the "uncertain regime" of the general articles was no
longer justified in the "vastly altered historic environment" of the contemporary military where members are no longer part of a "small,
professional, and voluntary" cadre "isolated from the mainstream of
civilian life."'
The articles in this Symposium point to a number of areas in
which existing legal mechanisms appear to be inadequate to control
the military. David Engdahl, a law professor, demonstrates the need
to return to the constitutional construct and intent in curbing the
executive's use of the armed forces in civil disorders. Lawrence
Baskir, Chief Counsel to the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, provides a case study of the role of
legislative oversight and litigation in attempting to impose constitutional restraints upon military surveillance and intelligence gathering
within the civilian community. Adam Yarmolinsky, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense under President Kennedy, describes the complexity of attempting to bring the military appropriations and budget
process under effective civilian control when the military-industrial
axis commands its own power base and exerts enormous political and
economic influence. Maurice Gamier, a sociologist, outlines the development of military sociology, with its insights into the behavior of
servicemen in the military environment, and of military political science,
with its interest in organizational and institutional structures and
operations, and focuses upon the role of Congress as central to the issue
of control of the military. Howard De Nike, until recently staff
attorney for the Lawyers Military Defense Committee representing
servicemen in the Far East and Europe, describes the spotty record of
the legal and administrative processes in dealing sensitively and constitutionally with military personnel problems arising out of racial
hostility, drugs, and dissent. Finally, the review of seven recent books
on the military by John Lovell, a political scientist, reveals some of
the institutional changes taking place in the military and the new
currents and, influences at work regarding personnel and institutional
policies.
Legal inadequacies in the process of controlling the military seem
tary and Civilian Occupational Structures, 73 Am. J. SocIoLOGY 381 (1968). But See
Moskos, The New Estrangement: Armed Forces and American Society, in PUBLIC
OPINION AND THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT 271 (C. Moskos ed. 1971).
12. 94 S. Ct. 2547, at 2574-75.
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to have a number of different origins. Sometimes they result from
structural deficiencies, such as the failure of Congress to establish
procedures to insure better control over military appropriations or to
monitor significant military developments."3 Sometimes they result
from administrative and operational weaknesses, as with the extraordinary power exercised by a few congressional committee chairmen
with close alliances to the military," or the failure of some military
officers and NCO's to carry out command policies concerning racial
equality.1 5 Not infrequently they stem from the nature of the legal
process itself.
As has already been suggested, the inability or unwillingness of
courts to employ methods and knowledge from other disciplines can
make them unresponsive to changed conditions in the military. The
process of judicial review also imposes constraints upon the courts. In
response to perceived constitutional and policy constraints, the courts
have adopted threshold requirements for review such as standing,
ripeness, justiciability, and exhaustion of remedies. Viewed as quintessential issues of law, these requirements have often been applied to
cases in the military context without sufficient examination of traditional generalizations about the nature of the military. Thus, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals disposed in two sentences of one of the first
cases challenging the constitutionality of the Vietnam War, declaring
that "the Constitution precludes judges from overseeing the conduct
of foreign policy or the use and disposition of military power."' 6 It
observed that it was only writing an opinion at all "to make it clear to
others comparably situated and similarly inclined that resort to the
courts is futile, in addition to being wasteful of judicial time, for which
there are urgent legitimate demands." Other litigants did not heed the
warning, and within a few years a number of courts had found the
issue to be justiciable, although generally ruling against the plaintiffs
on the merits. 7 These courts demonstrated a very different perception
of the nature and institutional role of both the courts and the military
from that in the former opinion, and their broader view of judicial
power in reference to constitutional limitations upon executive war13. See note 6 supra.
14. See McGAFFIN & KNOLL, supra note 6, at 61-101.
15. See NAACP, THE SEARCH FOR MILITARY JUSTICE: REPORT OF AN NAACP INQUIRY INTO THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEGRO SERVICEMAN IN WEST GERMANY (1971) (hereinafter NAACP REPORT); UNITED STATES DEFENSE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES (1972)
(hereinafter TASK FORCE).
16. Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

17. Id.
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making has permitted a larger role for the courts in overseeing military
policy.
The courts have been called upon in recent years to provide legal
remedies concerning the military in two significant areas: enforcement
of constitutional delegation of powers and review of the treatment and
disposition of military personnel. Court decisions in these areas indicate
how complex the issues are as to the appropriateness of judicial intervention, the scope of review, and the application of remedial powers.
They raise fundamental issues going both to the constitutional structure
of the American government and the role of the military establishment
in our democratic society.
1.

ENFORCEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF POWERS

The constitutional division of military powers between the executive and legislative branches, although not involving direct limitations
upon the armed forces, is of relevance to contemporary issues of control of the military. The requirement of a declaration of war by Congress provides a check upon the power of the military, since once a
crisis slips over into armed conflict, the options available to the nation
are narrowed and the military assumes an immensely larger role in
decisionmaking. The likelihood of public exposure and debate consequent to a congressional declaration of war provides a further check
upon a self-serving alliance between the executive and the military to
catapult the nation into hostilities. Similarly, the assignment to Congress of such powers as the right to call up the militia for a federal
army for limited purposes,' to appropriate all funds for the armed
18. Congress is empowered to "call forth" the militia for only three purposes: "to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." U.S.

CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. It is also empowered
[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
States, reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the Officers, and
the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. It appears that although the Founding Fathers gave Congress the power to raise and support armies and provide and maintain a navy, they did
not contemplate the establishment of a standing federal army but rather that the states
would maintain militia which could be called up by Congress for the three limited purposes. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 4, at 166. However, this arrangement was sorely
tested by historical developments. Shortly after the ratification of the Constitution, Napoleon introduced the first nationwide system of conscription in Europe, and other countries quickly followed suit. The first national draft in the United States was instituted
in the Civil War, but its constitutionality was never ruled on by the Supreme Court.
But see Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238 (1863) (holding the act constitutional). A national draft was imposed in the First World War and upheld as constitutional during
wartime. Selective Service Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). It was reintroduced
in 1940 and found constitutional, although the nation was not at war, by lower federal
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forces and to make rules for their government, are suited to obtaining
wider consideration and debate by the people's elected representatives,
in short to democratizing key military decisions to prevent their exclusive appropriation by professional military men and executive
officials. The history of secrecy and deception in Vietnam War decisionmaking revealed by the Pentagon Papers 9 should demonstrate that the
constitutional construct, although of limited value in providing day-today control over the armed forces, is still germane to the aim of controlling the military.
a. The War Power
Although the Supreme Court observed in 1952 that "nothing in
the Constitution is plainer than that the declaration of war is entrusted
to Congress,"2 the question as to when and how such declaration is to be
made has been left unresolved by the federal courts after some eight
years of litigation over the constitutionality of the Vietnam War. The
issue, raised in almost every conceivable way and by almost every conceivable kind of plaintiff, was never heard by the Supreme Court,
which exercised its discretionary authority over jurisdiction to forestall
courts. United States v. Lambert, 123 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1941). It remained in existence
after the Second World War, except for a short period in 1948, although there were
periods of minimal draft calls, and there have been no draft calls since 1973 when the
"volunteer army" went into effect. Challenges to the constitutionality of the draft during the Vietnam War were unanimously rejected by lower federal courts, on jurisdictional grounds and on the merits, and the Supreme Court refused to hear all such cases.
Hart v. United States, 391 U.S. 956 (1968); Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 956
(1968); Mitchell v. United States, 386 U.S. 972 (1967). In April 1970, the State of
Massachusetts passed a statute providing that its citizens in the U.S. armed forces could
not be required to serve outside the United States in armed hostilities "not an emergency"
or not "initially authorized or subsequently ratified by a congressional declaration of
war" according to the Constitution. In a suit by individual plaintiffs and the State as
parens patriae,it was argued, inter alia, that an "army" at the time the Constitution was
written was a volunteer organization, while "militia" comprised all able-bodied males
who could be involuntarily required to serve when necessary. If more troops were needed
than were available in the volunteer federal army, it was argued, Congress was expected
to call forth the militia, but only for the three enumerated purposes (to suppress an insurrection, repel an invasion, or execute a law of Congress) or, in peacetime, in preparation for these purposes if Congress had made a policy determination that such preparation
was necessary. The Vietnam War, it was claimed, did not fall into any of these categories. Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Constitutional Lawyers' Committee on
Undeclared War, Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970). See also A. D'AMATo &
R. O'NEIL, THE JUDIcIARY AND VIETNAM 89-97 (1972). The Supreme Court refused to
consider an original bill of complaint, and the First Circuit ultimately rejected these
claims and held that congressional support of the war through legislation over a prolonged period was a constitutionally sufficient authorization. Massachusetts v. Laird,
451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.), aff'g 327 F. Supp. 378 (D. Mass..1971).
19. THE PENTAGON PAPERS: THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HISTORY OF UNITED
STATES DECISIONMAKING ON VIETNAM (Gravel ed. 1971).
20. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
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review of such cases, and was denied consideration by a large majority
of lower federal courts on the grounds*of lack of standing or justici22
2
ability. Suits early in the war brought by citizens" and taxpayers
foundered on lack of standing, and challenges to the legality of the war
by draft violators2 3 and servicemen24 were refused consideration. However, as the war dragged on, courts found standing in an inductee who
was a selective conscientious objector,2" servicemen with orders to
Vietnam or subject to possible service in Vietnam,17 reservists who
might be activated and sent to Vietnam," and members of Congress.2
A number of these courts held that the issue raised a "political question"
which was not proper for the courts to consider." Others considered
the constitutional issue and found that Congress had authorized the
war through passage of appropriations and selective service acts, but
held that they could not review the propriety of the form used by the
executive and legislative branches which constituted a political question.
The Supreme Court has stated that,
[i]n determining whether a question falls within [the political
question] category, the appropriateness under our system of
government of attributing finality to the action of the political
departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a
21. Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd sub nor. Velvel v.
Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970).
22. Id.; Kalish v. United States, 411 F.2d 606 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835
(1969).
23. United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 972
(1967).
24. Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 934 (1967) ; Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
25. United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968).
26. Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'd as consolidated with Orlando
v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Orlando v. Laird,
317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
869 (1971).
27. Massachusetts v. Laird, 327 F. Supp. 378 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 451 F.2d 26 (1st
Cir. 1971).
28. Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd, 464 F.2d 178 (9th
Cir. 1972).
29. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 484 F.2d 1307
(2d Cir.), stay reinstated, 414 U.S. 1321 (1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1935 (1974);
Mitchell v. Laird, 476 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (printed in advance sheets, Withdrawn
by Order of Court).
30. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) ; DaCosta v. Laird, 471
F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973); Mitchell v. Laird, 476 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (printed in
advance sheets, Withdrawn by Order of Court).
31. DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451
F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971). For history
of cases challenging the constitutionality of the war through the middle of 1972, see
A. D'AmATo & R. O'Nan,,

THE JTDiCIARY AND VIETNAM

(1972).
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judicial determination are dominant considerations.3 2
In Baker v. Carr, the Court formulated six categories or situations
in which it is appropriate for courts to refuse to consider cases as
raising a political question.33 However, in Powell v. McCormack,3
the Court focused on the first category, whether there is "a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department." Plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of
the war generally maintained that the issue as to which branch of
government the Constitution committed the power to enter into the
Vietnam hostilities was for the judiciary to decide and that a political
question might only arise after the courts had determined that such
power had been committed to a coordinate branch. The first break in
the refusal of courts to consider cases challenging the constitutionality
of the Vietnam War came in the summer of 1970 when the Second
Circuit ruled in Berk v. Laird5 that the claim of a serviceman with
orders to Vietnam met the general standard for justiciability set out
in Baker, but remanded the case to determine whether there were
judically discoverable and manageable standards to resolve the issue.
On remand, the district court found that Congress had authorized the
sending of troops to Vietnam by appropriations and other supportive
legislation, but held that "the court would be entering the realm of
politics in saying that the authorization should have been couched in
different language.""
On appeal, the Second Circuit consolidated Berk with a similar
suit, Orlando v. Laird,7 and, in affirming the district court, held that
"the constitutional delegation of the war declaring power to the Congress contains a discoverable and manageable standard imposing on
32. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939) (footnote omitted), quoted in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
33. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question
is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.
369 U.S. at 217.
34. 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (quoted from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
35. 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970).
36. 317 F. Supp. 715, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
37. 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1970). For background of these cases and excerpts
from briefs, see L. FRIEDMAN & B. NEUBORNE, UNQUESTIONING OBEDIENCE TO THE PRES-
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the Congress a duty of mutual participation in the prosecution of
war" which is judicially determinable by a court. 8 It viewed the test
as "whether there is any action by the Congress sufficient to authorize
or ratify the military activity in question" and not whether there
had been an express and explicit authorization as the plaintiff contended was required by the "declare war" clause. 9 Having found that
there was "some mutual participation between the Congress and the
President," it would go no farther because "decisions regarding the
form and substance of congressional enactments authorizing hostilities
are determined by highly complex considerations of diplomacy, foreign
policy and military strategy inappropriate to judicial inquiry. )40
The First Circuit, applying a similar approach in Massachusetts
v. Laird a year later, noted that "we are aware that while we have
addressed the problem of justiciability in the light of the textual commitment criterion [i.e., that the Constitution, in giving some essential
military powers to Congress and others to the Executive, committed the
matter to both branches, precluding the judiciary from judging "joint
concord" against any specific clause in isolation], we have also addressed the merits of the constitutional issue."'" Thus it appears that
the courts have created a sort of presumption that once any congressional action in support of the war is shown, the constitutional criterion
(derived not just from the "declare war" clause but from all the military clauses) is met. This leaves a spavined "declare war" clause and
weights judicial determinations of the constitutionality of undeclared
military action rather heavily in favor of the Executive. It certainly
means that constitutional review in the courts can provide little check
upon undeclared hostilities and that, as has partially occurred with
the War Powers Act of 1973,42 the issue will be essentially relegated
to the political sphere.
Several cases in the last period of the war, when Congress was
increasingly attempting to deescalate it and impose time limitations upon
its conclusion,43 demonstrate the unwillingness of the judiciary to determine whether the Executive was complying with congressional guideACLU CASE AGAINST THE LEGALITY
443 F.2d at 1042.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1043.
451 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1971).

IDENT: THE

38.
39.
40.
41.

OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM

(1972).

42. 87 Stat. 555, 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4064-69 (1973). See also
text following note 63 infra.
43. For discussion of congressional actions, see 15 HARv. INT'L L.J. 143, 144 n.10,
145 n.11, 146 n.25, 147 n.26, 151 n.45 (1974).
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lines. In DaCosta v. Laird,"' a serviceman with orders to Vietnam
claimed that since the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the
legislative action in support of the war was constitutionally insufficient
to authorize its continuation. The court observed that "[i] f the Executive were now escalating the prolonged struggle instead of decreasing
it, additional supporting action by the Legislative Branch over what is
presently afforded, might well be required,""' but found that the two
branches were engaged in a combined effort to decelerate and terminate
the conflict. Having found some combined effort, the court, consistent
with Orlando, held that the
constitutional propriety of the method and means by which
they mutually participate in winding down the conflict and
disengaging the nation from it, is also a political question
and outside of the power and competency of the judiciary."
A year and a half later DaCosta was back before the courts again,
claiming that the President's May 8, 1972 orders for the mining of
North Vietnamese ports and harbors and the continuation of air and
naval strikes against North Vietnam constituted an escalation of the
war not authorized by prior congressional actions and prohibited by
the "Mansfield Amendment.""7 This time the Second Circuit upheld
the refusal of the court even to consider the issue, stating:
Judges, deficient in military knowledge, lacking vital information upon which to assess the nature of battlefield decisions,
and sitting thousands of miles from the field of action, cannot
reasonably or appropriately determine whether a specific
military operation constitutes an "escalation" of the war or
is merely a new tactical approach within a continuing strategic
plan.4 8
44. 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972).
45. Id. at 1370.
46. Id.
47. Act of Nov. 17, 1971, Title VI, 85 Stat. 423, 430, 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 450, 464 (1971). It provided that:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to terminate at
the earliest practicable date all military operations of the United States in Indochina, and to provide for the prompt and orderly withdrawal of all United
States military forces at a date certain, subject to the release of all American
prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied
with such Government and an accounting for all Americans missing in action
who have been held by or known to such Government or such forces.
It also urged and requested the President to implement this policy by establishing a final
date for withdrawal and negotiating an immediate cease-fire and other necessary arrangements.
48. DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1155 (2d Cir. 1973). An interim case also
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This decision seems to have relied particularly upon the two
"functionalist" categories of political question elaborated in Baker:
"a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the dispute]; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind dearly for non-judicial discretion.""0 The difficulty of satisfying these criteria was not as great
when the Vietnam War was being conducted according to a relatively
steady policy, whether of escalation or deescalation. Thus, Justice
Douglas, in dissenting from the Supreme Court's refusal to hear
Massachusetts v. Laird" in 1970, argued that there were discoverable
and manageable standards for decision because the case was not challenging acts of the Executive in repelling a sudden attack but rather
a war which had gone on for six years; the Second Circuit in Orlando
was also able to find manageable standards for judging the constitutional adequacy of the authorization for continuation of the war in
1970."' In contrast, when there has been a dramatic change in the
nature of hostilities, as with the mining of North Vietnamese harbors
and increased bombing of the north in 1972, a court is put in the
difficult position of having to make judgments on fast-moving events.
But if constitutional reservations on war-making are to have any
meaning, courts must be prepared to screen the available evidence to
determine if the issue can be resolved judicially, for otherwise a President would have an automatic grace period in which to engage in or
alter the nature of hostilities at will. The Second Circuit recognized
as much in the last DaCosta decision in observing that
we specifically do not pass on.

..

whethex a radical change

in the character of war operations . . . might be sufficiently

measurable judicially to warrant a court's consideration, i.e.,
might contain a standard which we seek in this record and do
not find. 2
involving this plaintiff can be found at DaCosta v. Laird, No. 72 C (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16,
1972),'iff'd without opinion, 456 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1972).
49. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Commentators have observed that the
six categories in Baker, supra note 33, seem to have derived from three different conceptions of the judicial role, the first representing the "classicist" view: Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 H. v. L. Rav. 1 (1959) ; the next two the
!'functionalist" view: Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional
Analysis, 75 YALz L.J. 517 (1966); and the last three the "prudentialist" view: A.
BICKEL, TIE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term,
83 HARV. L. RLv. 62, 63-68 (1969).
50. 400 U.S. 886, 892-93 (1970).
51. See note 37 supra.
52. 471 F.2d 1146, 1156 (2d Cir. 1973).
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The crucial factor then becomes whether a court will conscientiously
review the available evidence both as to a standard which might be
found in congressional legislation and debates and as to the fulfillment
of that standard or not by the new military action.
A good example of a court's retreating behind the political question doctrine and refusing to attempt to discover judicial standards
and to test military action against them is the decision at the very end
of the Indochina hostilities in Holtzman v. Schlesinger.5 3 In a suit
brought in 1973 after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, the
withdrawal of all American combat forces from Vietnam, and the
release of all known American prisoners of war, a Congresswoman
and four Air Force officers who had refused bombing orders in Cambodia claimed that continued bombing of Cambodia lacked congressional authorization. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's
grant of declaratory and injunctive relief (the first time a federal court
has enjoined officials of the executive branch from combat activities)"
stating:
We are not privy to the information supplied to the Executive
by his professional military and diplomatic advisers and
even if we were, we are hardly competent to evaluate it. If we
were incompetent to judge the significance of the mining and
bombing of North Vietnam's harbors and territories, we fail
to see our competence to determine that the bombing of
Cambodia is a "basic change" in the situation and that it is not
a "tactical decision" within the competence of the President. 5
The particularly troubling aspect of this decision is that the court
found the issue of congressional authorization of the bombing nonjusticiable without even considering recent evidence of legislative
intent or the scope of the military action involved. Congress had been
engaged for some time in debating and passing various kinds of bills
to "cut-off" appropriations or limit the war effort.5 6 An appropria53. 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'g 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y.).
54. The Second Circuit granted a stay of the district court's order of declaratory
and injunctive relief, 42 U.S.L.W. 1017 (July 27, 1973), application to vacate denied, 414
U.S. 1304 (1973). Justice Douglas then vacated the stay, 414 U.S. 1316 (1973), but Justice Marshall, acting with the concurrence of the rest of the Court, reinstated it, 414

U.S. 1321 (1973).

55. 484 F.2d 1307, 1310 (2d Cir. 1973). A similar suit filed by a Congressman in
Massachusetts was dismissed on the ground of political question. Drinan v. Nixon, 364
F. Supp. 853 (D. Mass. 1973).
56. See note 43 supra.
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tions bill passed on July 1, 1973, and signed by the President, provided
that no funds could be expended for combat activities "in or over or
from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia ' 7 after August 15, but its supporters had maintained that acceptance of the cut-off date would not be a recognition of authority to
continue bombing up to that date.5" The congressional debates, although sometimes contradictory, provided significant evidence as to
whether congressional appropriations could be considered to authorize
continued bombing in Cambodia. Furthermore, in July, 1973, there
were disclosures that the administration had engaged in secret bombing in Cambodia and Laos in 1969-71, and that reports had been
falsified to keep the information from Congress and the public. 9
Judge Oakes, dissenting from the Second Circuit majority, observed
that this new information raised doubts as to the effectiveness of prior
appropriations bills to authorize the Cambodian bombing since "for
authorization on the part of Congress by way of an appropriation to
be effective, the congressional action must be based on knowledge of
the facts."6
It appears that a court could have looked to the evidence as to
congressional intent and the degree to which the bombing in Cambodia constituted a "basic change" in the situation without infringing
upon legitimate military and diplomatic prerogatives. The military is
capable of providing manageable descriptions and analyses of the scope
and objectives of particular combat missions, and there seems to be no
reason that a court, sitting in camera if necessary to protect security
information, is incapable of understanding and digesting such information. This would not substitute the judge for military commanders
or the President in making tactical decisions any more than do other
constitutional determinations that, under the particular circumstances
of the case before the court, one branch of government has exceeded
its constitutional authority. There are ways, as pointed out by Judge
Sweigert in a 1970 decision holding that a challenge to the war was
57. Joint Resolution Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal 1974, 87 Stat.
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 150, 153 (1973).
58. See 484 F.2d 1307, 1317 (2d Cir. 1973)
59. Id.

130, 1973

(Oakes, J., dissenting).

60. Id. at 1316. See also Mitchell v. Laird, 476 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (printed
in advance sheets, Withdrawn by Order of Court), dismissing an earlier challenge to the
war by thirteen members of Congress on the ground that it is "a political question, or,
to phrase it more accurately, a discretionary matter for Congress to decide in which
form, if any, it will give its consent to the continuation of a war already begun by a
President acting alone," but in which two of three judges (Bazelon and Wyzanski)
stated that they were no longer persuaded that appropriations, draft extension and cognate legislation provided a valid congressional assent to the war.
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justiciable,"' by which courts can minimize "undesirable, practical
consequences of charting new requirements in constitutional law" so
as not to be "called upon to decide what to do about the Vietnam War
[but] only to decide the legal question" of who must authorize it and
how such authority must be expressed." Even less than in, for example,
reapportionment and school desegregation cases, it appears that a
court's declaration of unconstitutionality of particular military actions
need not involve it in making tactical decisions in the military sphere.
The tremendous litigative effort during the Vietnam War to
obtain judicial enforcement of the constitutional delegation of warmaking powers resulted in a healthy limitation of the political question
doctrine to permit courts to consider in which branch the Constitution
rests the authority to engage in particular hostilities. However, limitations placed on that review by permitting, as in Orlando, a finding of
some joint action between the executive and legislative branches to
preclude further review and by excluding from review, as in Holtzman,
military developments on the grounds that they are "tactical decisions"
considerably reduces any promise of remedy.
The issue will be substantially changed in future hostilities by
virtue of Congress' assertion of war powers in an act passed, over
presidential veto, in late 1973.6" It provides that when a President commits American troops to hostilities abroad or substantially increases
the number of troops equipped for combat in a foreign country, he must
report to Congress within 48 hours the circumstances, authority for,
and scope of the action. He is required to stop the operation unless
Congress approves it within sixty days, except that he may continue
it for thirty days more if necessary to protect the American forces.
Congress may order the operation stopped within that period by passing
a concurrent resolution that would not be subject to presidential veto.
This act provides much more precise standards for judicial review of
future executive war-making which should be amenable to judicial
resolution in the future.
b. The Appropriations Power
Recognizing the power of the purse, the Founding Fathers sought
to limit the Commander in Chief's control over the military by giving
Congress the exclusive power to appropriate funds for the support of
the armed forces. The law has played little part in the enforcement
61. Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd on other grounds,
464 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1972).
62. 318 F. Supp. at 54.

63. 87 Stat. 555, 1973 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD. NEws 4064-69 (1973).
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and administration of this power which has been carried out through
complex interplay between executive and military budget officials and
congressional committees, described in part by Adam Yarmolinsky
and Maurice Gamier in their articles. The military has developed its
own power base with powerful committee chairmen and members of
Congress, and, with a few notable exceptions, has succeeded in obtaining
appropriations with little concomitant oversight or control. Administrative law, although it could reach a variety of aspects of the executive budget process, has never been much resorted to and has virtually
no place in discretionary congressional operations.
The Constitution does contain several provisions intended to
provide a check upon the congressional appropriations power. A clause
requiring that appropriations of money for the support of the army be
limited to two years (borrowed from an English parliamentary limitation imposed in 1689 as a restraint against a standing army) is no
longer an effective limitation. 4 No modern military which must depend
upon ongoing weapons research and technology could function under
such a burden, and the appropriation of "no year" funds without limitation as to year of expenditure has been used to circumvent it."5
Two other constitutional provisions aimed at assuring congressional independence of the military and at making appropriations public
to enable voters to oversee Congress' exercise of that power were
dredged out of obscurity by litigants during -the Vietnam War. In
0 a federal
United States v. Richardson,"
taxpayer sought a declaratory
judgment that the Central Intelligence Agency Act, 7 which permits the
CIA to account for its expenditures "solely on the certificate of the
Director," violated the constitutional provision that "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money
shall be published from time to time." 8 In Schlesinger v. Reservists
9 taxpayer
Committee to Stop the War,"
members of an antiwar organization sought to require the Secretary of Defense and service secretaries to strike from the reserves some one hundred members of Congress on the grounds that their holding of reserve commissions violated
the "Incompatibility Clause" stating that "no Person holding any Office
under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his
64. Art. I, § 8, ed. 12.

65. 40 Op. AT'y GEN. 555 (1949). See also Yarmolinsky, Civilian Control: New
Perspectives for New Problems, 49 IND. L.J. 654 (1974), infra.
66. 94 S. Ct. 2940 (1974).
67. 50 U.S.C. §§ 403a-403j (1970).
68. Art. I, § 9, cd. 7.
69. 94 S. Ct. 2925 (1974).
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Continuance in Office."70
The plaintiffs succeeded in the lower courts, 7 but on June 25,
1974, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court opinions in both
cases on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The Supreme
Court had stated in Baker v. Carr72 that the test for standing was
whether the plaintiff "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues . . ." and in Flast v. Cohen" that the question
was whether the taxpayer had established a relationship with his claim
under the taxing and spending clause so as to assure that "the questions
will be framed with the necessary specificity, that the issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that the litigation will be
pursued with the necessary vigor .
. ."
It would be curious to
question the sense of adverseness of the plaintiffs in Richardson and
Reservists Committee; they were strong opponents of the war and of
the particular congressional action they were challenging. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion found that they lacked
standing because they had shown no "injury in fact" and their claims
constituted only a "generalized grievance" in which the impact upon
them was "undifferentiated and 'common to all members of the
public.' ""
The impact of .these decisions on federal litigation in general may
be considerable, and there is not space here to discuss the intricacies of
the standing doctrine in a more general context. But there was language
in Burger's decision in Reservists Committee indicating that the subject matter of these cases contributed to the narrow decision as to
standing. In being asked to undertake constitutional litigation, he
stated, a court must consider that here plaintiffs "seek an interpretation
of a constitutional provision which has never before been construed by
70. Art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
71. Reservists Committee to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C.
1971), aff'd, 465 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Schlesinger v. Reservists
Committee to Stop the War, 94 S. Ct. 2940 (1974); Richardson v. United States, 465
F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1972) (vacating order of lower court and remanding), rev'd, 94 S. Ct.
2925 (1974).
72. 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
73. 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
74. 94 S. Ct. 2940, 2946 (1974). A district court in Pennsylvania had earlier held
that citizens, but not taxpayers, had standing to challenge the expenditure of funds appropriated by Congress for the war in Southeast Asia, Atlee v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 1347
(E.D. Pa. 1972), but later dismissed the suit on political question grounds, 347 F. Supp.
689 (1972), aff'd without opinion, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). In Morrison v. Callaway, 369
F. Supp. 1160 (D.D.C. 1974), a suit challenging the legality of General Alexander Haig,
Jr. serving as assistant to the President while retaining his army commission, no standing
was found in plaintiffs as either citizens or taxpayers.
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the federal courts" and that "the relief sought would, in practical
effect, bring about conflict with both coordinate branches." 5 This
seems to be another instance of judicial reluctance to enforce constitutional reservations against coordinate branches of government in the
military and appropriations powers area.
Burger distinguished recent cases which found standing as to
private competitive injury to a business association" and as to injury to
enjoyment of natural resources to an environmental group 7 as involving specific, concrete injury while here citizens were attempting to "call
on the courts to resolve abstract questions. '7' However, the dissenters
had no difficulty in finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently direct and
personalized interests to seek enforcement of these constitutional provisions. Dissenting in Richardson, Justice Douglas argued that "no
one has a greater 'personal stake' in policing this protective measure
than a taxpayer" since it was inserted in the Constitution to give the
public knowledge of the way public funds are expended.7 Justice
Stewart maintained that the clause created an enforceable affirmative
duty on the government with respect to all taxpayers and citizen-voters
to make a public report of all receipts and expenditures.8" In Reservists
Committee, Justice Marshall argued that the plaintiffs have a right
under the Incompatibility Clause to have their arguments considered by
Congressmen not subject to a conflict of interest by virtue of their
positions in the reserves, 8 ' while Justice Douglas claimed that they had
a personal stake in "keeping the Incompatibility Clause an operative
force in government by freeing the entanglement of the federal bureaucracy with the Legislative Branch."82
The Richardson and Reservists Committee decisions represent a
significant withdrawal of the availability of the courts to enforce the
constitutional delegation of powers as to military affairs. It means that
certain clauses in the Constitution may not be judicially enforceable.
Justice Burger's response to the plaintiff's arguments that if they did not
have standing, it was doubtful that anyone would, was:
Our system of government leaves many crucial decisions to
75. 94 S. Ct. 2925, 2932 (1974).

76. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970).
77. United

States

v.

Students

Challenging

Regulatory

Agency

(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).

78. 94 S. Ct. 2925, 2933 (1974).
79. 94 S. Ct. 2940, 2956, at 2958 (1974).
80. 94 S. Ct. 2940, 2959, at 2959-60 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
81. 94 S. Ct. 2925, 2939, at 2939-40 (1Q74) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. 94 S. Ct. 2925, 2936, at 2938 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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the political processes. The assumption that if respondents
have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not
a reason to find standing.8
There is a certain disingenuousness in referring citizens to the
political branches for enforcement of constitutional limitations in cases
involving violations of those very branches. Although, over the years,
hundreds of members of Congress have accepted commissions in the
reserves, the Congress has not enforced the Incompatibility Clause
against any member since 1916.4 And, as Justice Douglas stated in
Richardson, the necessity for citizens to enforce their constitutional
right to information about expenditures "only through the 'slow,
cumbersome and unresponsive' electoral process" can hardly have been
what the Founding Fathers intended in putting this express provision
in the Constitution. 5 Recent disclosures of large expenditures by the
CIA in support of clandestine political and revolutionary activities in
foreign countries raise further questions as to the wisdom of insulating
the requirement to provide information as to Congress' appropriation
function from judicial scrutiny. 6
c. The Civil-Military Relationship
The Constitution, as David Engdahl points out so well in his
article, was drafted in light of certain extant concepts and practices
concerning the role of the military in civilian society. Notions of limiting the military to its proper sphere, some of them deriving from
English precedents, are particularly relevant to the "militia" clauses of
Article I, but also inhere in other clauses, both expressly as in the third
amendment's prohibition on quartering of troops, and by implication
in the military powers clauses and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. However, there has been a trend since World War
I away from the traditional American distrust of the military and
towards the centralization of extraordinary military powers in the Commander in Chief to deal with a variety matters not directly related to
warfare itself. Senator Charles M. Mathias, Jr. of Maryland notes
with alarm:
As a consequence of presidential proclamations of national
emergency during the past 40 years, Congress has passed or
83. 94 S.Ct. at 2935.
84. Maloney, Analysis: Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, PREVIEW or U.S. Sup. CT. CASES No. 21, at 1 (Feb. 22, 1974).
85. 94 S. Ct. 2940, 2958.
86. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
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recodified over 470 statutes delegating to the president prerogatives that it previously had reserved for itself. It has
not established any means to withdraw that authority once the
emergency has passed. .

.

. The fact that emergency statutes

in the United States are loosely drafted and obscurely worded
gives executive officials acting under an emergency proclamation dangerously broad discretion.
Lawrence Baskir, David Engdahl, and Howard De Nike describe
two areas in which there is doubt as to the propriety of recent military
involvement in the civilian sphere-surveillance and intelligence-gathering among civilians, and use of military forces in civil disturbances,
particularly as proposed under broad and open-ended Civil Disturbance
Regulations. However, there is some doubt as to whether these practices can be challenged in the courts. Even if, as Professor Engdahl
argues, a good case can be made that the proposed Civil Disturbance
Regulations are unconstitutional, it may well be that judicial review
cannot be obtained.
The Supreme Court's 1972 decision in the military surveillance
case, Laird v. Tatum,"' provides a good example of the barriers to
judicial review in this area. It arose out of an order by President
Johnson in 1967, pursuant to a statute empowering the President to
use the armed forces to suppress insurrection and domestic violence, 9
that the army assist local authorities in gathering data for use in
civil disorder situations. The military operations mushroomed until
thousands of military agents were conducting surveillance and intelligence-gathering, including maintaining files on the membership and
practices of virtually every activist political group in the country, infiltrating groups to reach their confidential files, and using a variety
of photographic and electronic equipment for clandestine surveillance.
A number of individuals and organizations subjected to surveillance
brought a class action to enjoin these activities, raising questions as to
the President's authority under the statute to order such extensive
intelligence-gathering, the constitutionality of such activities by the
military in the civilian sphere, and the propriety of such activities under
the first amendment. However, the Supreme Court, in a majority
opinion by Chief Justice Burger, held that the plaintiffs lacked standing, finding that they had not shown any direct injury and that mere
87. Mathias, State of Emergency: Legislator's Viewpoint, CIVIL LIBERTIES REV. 75,
77 (1974). The National Emergency Act, unanimously passed by the Senate, would repeal
or suspend most of these statutes. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1974, at 1, col. 2.

88. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
89. 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1970).
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knowledge of military investigative activity which might be broader
than necessary and might in the future take other and additional action
detrimental to them fell short of a "chilling" of first amendment
rights."
It seems likely that government surveillance does tend to inhibit
citizens from joining groups and engaging in conduct which are known
to be under surveillance, but the Court considered such effects uncertain
and speculative. It clearly felt that the usual liberal standing rules as
to the "chilling" of first amendment rights must be tempered in a
situation such as this involving military activities in the sensitive area
of national security. Burger's opinion charged that plaintiffs were
simply seeking
a broad scale investigation, conducted by themselves as
private parties armed with the subpoena power of a federal
district court and the power of cross-examination to probe
into the Army's intelligence-gathering activities
and that the logical end would be for the federal courts to become
"continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action."'" Thus basic to the Court's holding was judicial reluctance to
permit a collateral aspect of a law suit, the discovery process, to be
used to delve into secret military operations.
As Mr. Baskir points out, discovery was an important objective
of the suit, and particularly so for the Senate subcommittee whose
attempts to obtain such information through the process of legislative
investigation had been thwarted. Thus Burger's concern that the suit
was a "fishing expedition" was not entirely unjustified. However, the
plaintiffs had rather clear justifications for further discovery. They
might well have been able to show personal injury had they been permitted to discover the dossiers maintained on them, dossiers which,
without meaningful limitations upon their use, might be used to their
prejudice in the future in anything from an application for federal
government employment to obtaining a security clearance for a job
with a private employer. If the principal concern of the Court was to
protect security information not relevant to the law suit, it could have
ordered the lower court to conduct an in camera examination of the
army's files to prevent disclosure of information not relevant to the
suit or limited disclosure to the individual plaintiffs rather than the
90. 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
91. Id. at 14-15.
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class. 2 Instead the Court's decision effectively rendered allegedly
unconstitutional actions of the military immune from judicial review,
consigning litigants to the "Catch 22" situation of being denied standing because of lack of proof of real injury, yet being incapable of using
judicial discovery processes to force disclosure of the very information
which could demonstrate such injury. This result was a critical blow
to judicial enforcement of constitutional limitations upon the military.
2. REVIEW OF TREATMENT AND DISPOSITION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Civilian courts have traditionally acknowledged that they lack
jurisdiction to interfere with determinations by the military concerning its own personnel. It has been asserted that this doctrine is required by the constitutional delegation of powers over the armed forces
to the executive and legislative branches" and by the need for military
autonomy in maintaining internal discipline and order.9 With respect
to review of court-martial decisions, American law followed the English
concept that military courts provide an autonomous system of jurisprudence which, due to the exigencies of military life, should not be
reviewed or interfered with by the civil courts. However, the unavailability of civil court review of courts-martial does not extend to habeas
corpus jurisdiction. The policy reasons for habeas corpus as a last
remedy for a petitioner in unlawful custody 5 were as ancient and
compelling as the policy of noninterference with the military, and
when the two interests collided, habeas corpus was the victor."
a. Court-MartialJurisdiction
Habeas corpus jurisdiction was originally limited to the issue of
whether the court-martial had proper jurisdiction over the person and
the offense. Thus, in the 1866 case of Ex parte Milligan," the Supreme
Court ruled that a civilian could not be tried by a military court,
ordering the release of a Southern sympathizer who had been condemned to death for treason by a Union court-martial. The Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMIJ),98 passed by Congress in 1950,
92. See discussion in The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REv. 52, 135-37
(1972).
93. See W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 49 (2d ed. 1920).
94. See Barker, Military Law--A Separate System of Jurisprudence,36 U. GIN. L.
REv. 223, 237 (1967); Fratcher, Review by the Civil Courts of Judgments of Federal
Military Tribunals,10 OHIO ST. L.J. 271, 276 (1949).
95. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) ; Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75,
95 (1807).
96. Ex parte Milligan, 71.U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
97. Id.
98. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970).
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provided for court-martial jurisdiction over all crimes committed by
servicemen (no matter when or where) as well as by certain civilians.
However, the Supreme Court began chipping away at this expansionist
view of military jurisdiction with its 1955 decision in United States ex
rel. Toth v. Quarles9 9 in which it held that jurisdiction over discharged
servicemen was unconstitutional. Justice Black, writing for the court,
found, that a number of fundamental rights which are provided a
criminal defendant in a trial in a federal court established by article III
of the Constitution-such as a jury chosen from different walks of
life and independent judges protected by life tenure-are not available
in a court-martial. Considering the disciplinary nature of courtsmartial, he concluded that
conceding to military personnel that high degree of honesty
and sense of justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly
have, it still remains true that military tribunals have not
been and probably never can be constituted in such way
that they can have the same kind of qualifications that the
Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in
federal courts.'0 0
He found little military necessity for denying civilian ex-soldiers a
trial in a civilian court for offenses committed while they were on
active duty, and expressed reservations concerning broad court-martial
jurisdiction:
There are dangers lurking in military trials which were sought
to be avoided by the Bill of Rights and Article III of our
Constitution. Free countries of the world have tried to
restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed
absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops
in active service. 0 1
After Toth, the Supreme Court also struck down court-martial
jurisdiction over civilian dependents accompanying the armed forces
outside the United States-in peacetime0 2 and civilian employees of the
military overseas in peacetime. 3 However, with the Vietnam War,
the military dusted off Article 2(10) of the UCMJ, which provides
99. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
100. Id. at 17.
101. Id. at 22.
102. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) ; Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton,
361 U.S. 234 (1960).
103. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guargliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) ; Grisham
v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
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for court-martial "in time of war [of] persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field," and obtained court-martial
convictions abroad of a number of civilian military employees. 1"' But
in 1969, a merchant seaman being held for trial for murder in a courtmartial in Vietnam petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The District
of Columbia Circuit held in Latney v. Ignatius"" that an expansive
interpretation of Article 2(10) would be unconstitutional and thus
Article 2(10) had to be read as not reaching
this civilian seaman, employed by a private shipping company,
and in no closer physical proximity or duration to the armed
forces than a seaman in port for a short period, living on his
ship and under the discipline of his civilian captain while
waiting for it to turn around, not assimilated to any military
personnel in terpns of living quarters or conditions, who had
been arrested for a crime committed in a bar frequented by
civilians in port.
A year later the Court of Military Appeals held in United States v.
Averette... that Article 2(10) only applied in wars formally declared
by Congress, thus beating a judicious retreat on the lower military
court's claim of court-martial jurisdiction over a civilian employee
charged with larceny of government property in Vietnam and effectively ending the military's attempt to try civilians accompanying the
forces abroad by court-martial.
7 the
In 1969, in the landmark case of O'Callahan v. Parker,"'
Supreme Court held that "status" as an active duty serviceman was
not itself sufficient to make exercise of court-martial jurisdiction constitutional and that courts-martial may only exercise jurisdiction over
servicemen's offenses which are "service-connected." Thus it found no
court-martial jurisdiction to try a sergeant for housebreaking, assault,
and attempted rape committed in a hotel in Honolulu while he was offduty and in civilian clothes. Justice Douglas' opinion specifically held
that court-martial jurisdiction over non-service-connected offenses deprives a serviceman of his fifth amendment right to indictment by grand
104. See, e.g., United States v. Latney, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 677 (1967) (application for
writ of habeas corpus and mandamus denied) ; United States v. Grossman, 42 C.M.R. 529
(ACMR 1970).

DEP'T OF ARMY, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERvIcE, Pam. 27-67-2, at 12

(Jan. 25, 1967) advised that "Article 2(10) is a valid, constitutional statute [for trial of]
civilian employees of the Armed Forces and of contractors in Vietnam who are engaged
in activities in support of combat operations."

105. 416 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
106. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 363, 41 C.M.R. 363 (1970).
107. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
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jury and his right under the sixth amendment and article III, section
2 to trial by jury. However, he also expressed fundamental doubts as
to the fairness of the military justice system, echoing the sentiments
of Justice Black in Toth, stating, "[a] court-martial is not yet an
independent instrument of justice but remains to a significant degree
a specialized part of the overall mechanism by which military discipline
is preserved."' 0 8 The military were especially offended by the sweeping
indictment of the quality of military justice presented by Justice
Douglas in a somewhat one-sided opinion with little factual and authoritative support. 9 However, O'Callahan's critique of military justice
has gained considerable support as later articles" 0. and studies"' have
reached similar conclusions, and as the dire effects upon military discipline, efficiency, and administration did not materialize.
One might have expected the Supreme Court in applying O'Callahan to adopt the principle enunciated by Justice Black in Toth that
military tribunals should be restricted "to the narrowest jurisdiction
deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops in
However, in the first post-O'Callahan decision to
active service.""'
reach the Court, Relford v. Commandant,1 3 the unanimous opinion
108. Id. at 265.
109. For criticisms of the opinion, see Everett, O'Callahanv. Parker-Milestoneor
Millstone in Military Justice?, 1969 DUKE L.J. 853; McCoy, Equal Justice for Servicemen: The Situation Before and Since O'Callahanv. Parker, 16 N.Y.L.F. 1 (1970); Nelson & Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses:
An Analysis of O'Callahanv. Parker,54 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1969).
110. See, e.g., P. BARNES, PAWNS, THE PLIGHT OF THE CITIZEN SOLDIER 151-245
(1972); F. GARDNER, THE UNLAWFUL CONCERT, AN ACCOUNT OF THE PRESIDIO MUTINY
CASE (1970); R. RIVKIN, G.I. RIGHTS AND ARMY JUSTICE: THE DRAFTEE's GUIDE To
MILITARY LIFE AND LAW (1970); R. SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS
MILITARY MUSIC IS TO MUSIC (1970); Benson, Military Justice in the Consumer Per-

spective, 13 ARIZ. L. REv. 595 (1971) ; Burris & Jones, Civilian Courts and Courts-Martial-The Civilian Attorney's Perspective, 10 Am. CRIm. L. REV. 139 (1971) ; Fairbanks,
Disciplinary Discharges-Restrictingthe Commander's Discretion, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 291
(1971) ; Fuchsberg, Command Influence on Military Justice, 7 TRIAL 36 (1971); Rothblatt, Military Justice or Injustice: The Green Beret Case, 75 CASE & COMMENT 3
(1970); Larkin, Should the Military Less-Than-Unanimous Verdict of Guilt Be Retained?, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 237 (1971); Remcho, Military Juries: ConstitutionalAnalysis
and the Need for Reform, 47 IND. L.J. 193 (1972) ; Sherman, The Civilianizationof Military Law, 22 MAINE L. REv. 3 (1970) ; Comment, Stacked Juries: A Problem of Military
Injustice, 11 SANTA CLARA LAW. 362 (1971); Van Loan, The Jury, the Court-Martial,
and the Constitution, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 363 (1972); West, Command Influence, in
CONSCIENCE AND COMMAND 73 (f. Finn ed. 1971); Willis, The Constitution, the United
States Court of Military Appeals and the Future, 57 MIL. L. REv. 27 (1972); Willis,
The United States Court of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Operation and Future, 55
MIL. L. REv. 39 (1972).
111. See, e.g., NAACP REPORT, supra note 15; TASK FORCE, supra note 15; The
CongressionalBlack Caucus Report, Racism in the Military: A New System for Rewards
and Punishment, 118 CONG. REC. E 8674-88 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1972).
112. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955).

113. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
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by Justice Blackmun took a decidedly less hostile tone towards military
justice and indicated that service-connection might be found even
when the offense is a civilian one or many of its incidents were civilian
rather than military. The actual holding, that the kidnapping and rape
on a military post of the sister of another serviceman was serviceconnected, was easy to accept. But some of the factors listed by Justice
Blackmun as significant, such as "the absence of any flouting of military
authority" and of any "threat to a military post," suggest expanded
situations in which court-martial jurisdiction over civilian-type offenses
would be appropriate.
This trend was even more evident in the Court's 1973 decision in
Gosa v. Mayden"5 which denied retroactive effect to O'Callahan. Rejecting the argument that O'Callahan was a "jurisdictional" decision
which determined that military courts lack power over non-service connected offenses,"' Justice Blackmun, writing for a 6-3 majority, found
it had only determined the "appropriate exercise" of jurisdiction. The
serviceman had argued that the absence of rights to grand jury and
jury and the disciplinary and command-dominated structure of the
court-martial infected the "integrity of the truth-determining process"
and thus that the fairness of his pre-O'Callahan conviction was in
doubt." ' In an apparent departure from the philosophy expressed in
Toth and O'Callahan,Justice Blackmun described the rights to grand
jury and jury as only playing "some role in assuring the integrity of
the truth-determining process," and court-martial proceedings as "not
basically unfair."" He further noted that retroactive application of
114. They are:
1. The serviceman's proper absence from the base. 2. The crime's commission
away from the base. 3. Its commission at a place not under military control.
4. Its commission within our territorial limits and not in an occupied zone of a
foreign country. 5. Its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to

authority stemming from the war power. 6. The absence of any connection between the defendant's military duties and the crime.

7. The victim's not being

engaged in the performance of any duty relating to the military. 8. The presence and availability of a civilian court in which the case can be prosecuted.
9. The absence of any flouting of military authority. 10. The absence of any
threat to a military post. 11. The absence of any violation of military property.
12. The offense's being among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian courts.

Id. at 365.
115. 413 U.S. 665 (1973). For a critical analysis of the case, see Karpatldn, The
Supreme Court Spurns the Gr,217 THE NATION 328 (1973).
116. Id. at 673-75.
117. See United States ex rel. Flemings v. Chaffee, 330 F. Supp. 193 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1972), (holding O'Callahanretroactive on the basis of
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)). Contra, Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264,
41 C.M.R. 264 (1970).
118. 413 U.S. 665, 680-81 (1973).
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O'Callahan would require "wholesale invalidation of convictions
rendered years ago," resulting in inability to retry many persons
because of unavailability of witnesses and evidence, which society could
not tolerate given that courts-martial provide "essential justice."1"9
The Gosa opinion raises some doubt as to the Court's continued
adherence to the O'Callahan rationale, a doubt emphasized by Justice
Rehnquist's statement in his concurring opinion that O'Callahan was
wrongly decided. 2 ' The military courts only reluctantly accepted
O'Callahan"' and have generally interpreted it so as to retain as much
court-martial jurisdiction as possible."' A number of federal courts
have disagreed with the position of the Court of Military Appeals that
drug offenses committed off-post are "service-connected,"" ' and the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari on a case raising the issue."'
A reversal of or major retreat from O'Callahan, based on a rationale
that there is little constitutionally significant difference between civilian
trials and courts-martial, would be an unfortunate setback both for
servicemen's rights and for legal control of the military. The O'Callahan rule has brought the United States into conformity with most
European nations which provide either for civilian trial of servicemen
for all offenses (as in West Germany, Sweden, Austria, and Denmark)
or for offenses which affect the person or property of a civilian (as in
the United Kingdom)." Broad military court jurisdiction is often a
sign of stunted democratic procedures in a country. In the Republic of
South Vietnam, for example, military courts which began in the 1950's
as emergency and temporary institutions to try local military-related
offenses gradually expanded their jurisdiction until, by the mid-1970's,
they had become the major instrument of judicial power in the coun119. Id. at 685.
120. Id. at 692.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 550-60, 40 C.M.R. 259
262-72 (1969) (Quinn, J., dissenting).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Beeker, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969)
(drug offenses no matter where committed) ; United States v. Rego, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 9,

41 C.M.R. 9 (1969)

(housebreaking and larceny in the civilian community where victim.

was a fellow serviceman); United States v. Morisseau, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 17, 41 C.M.R. 17

(1969)

(check forgery off-post facilitated by military status) ; United States v. Keaton,

19 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R. 64 (1969) (assault committed overseas).
123. Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972) ; Lyle v. Kincaid, 352 F. Supp. 81
(M.D. Fla. 1972); Moylan v. Laird, 305 F. Supp. 551 (D.R.I. 1969).
. 124. Councilman v. Laird, 481 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom.
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 94 S. Ct. 839 (1974).
125. See Sherman, Military Justice Without Military Control, 82 YALE LJ. 1398
(1973).
126. Shipler, Saigon's Military Courts Dominate Judicial System, N.Y. Times, Aug.
19, 1974, at 1, col. 7, & 12, col. 4.
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try. ' A 1970 Vietnamese Supreme Court decision that military field
courts were unconstitutional was ignored as military courts extended
their authority over cases, such as prosecutions of civilians for criticizing
government policies, which were previously within the purview of
civilian courts.'
Similarly, military courts were given a broad jurisdiction by the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong, often being used
to insure "political homogeneity" and repress "political offenders and
anti-revolutionary elements."' 2 8 American military courts have neither
the same flagrant history of usurping civilian court functions nor the
lack of due process found in Vietnam, but the absence of rights such
as the right to trial by jury and the all-military administration make
them subject to some of the same concerns. O'Callahan might well be
viewed as essentially a civil-military relations case, interpreting and
implementing the concerns expressed in the Constitution that military
authority be limited to prevent undue influence in the civilian sphere.
b. Constitutional Rights in Courts-Martial
Even though civilian courts traditionally accepted cases on habeas
corpus challenging court-martial jurisdiction, they have not always
considered claims that the court-martial proceedings were unconstitutional in other ways. However, in 1953 in Burns v. Wilson,"9 a case
in which convicted servicemen claimed they had been unconstitutionally
held incommunicado and interrogated after their arrest by military
police, the Supreme Court decided for the first time that a federal court
could go beyond the jurisdictional issue and consider whether there had
been a denial of constitutional rights which the military had failed to
consider. Since Burns, there has been disagreement among federal courts
as to how broad the Supreme Court intended habeas corpus review of
courts-martial to be, and the Supreme Court has not spoken again on
the issue. Some circuits have held that if a court finds that the courtmartial and military appeals courts gave "full and fair consideration"
to the serviceman's claims that his constitutional rights had been denied,
it must deny the writ even if it believes that he was deprived of a constitutional right.13 Other courts, which seem to be gaining adherents
among the circuits, have held that review should extend to all claimg of
denial of constitutional rights in the court-martial process. 1 ' Following
127. Id.
128. Communist Court Systems in Vietnam Reflect Military, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19,
1974, at 12, col. 1.
129. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
130. Broussard v. Patton, 466 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1972); Kennedy v. Commandant,

377 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1967).

131. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 2547 (1974);
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this standard, federal courts have reversed court-martial convictions
on grounds that the defendant was not provided adequate counsel or
was denied other constitutional rights not clearly inapplicable in the
military setting.

2

The Vietnam War brought a rash of new legal challenges to
court-martial practices. Although the military appeals courts, headed
by the civilian Court of Military Appeals, have a good record for keeping military due process rights abreast of expanding civilian constitutional doctrine, especially in such areas as search and seizure and selfincrimination, they have been generally unresponsive to constitutional
challenges to basic features of the court-martial system as established
in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. One of the most concerted
challenges to fundamental court-martial practices arose out of the
convictions of Vietnam war dissenters for military offenses which were
vague or constituted a direct infringement on free speech. Article
88,' forbidding officers from uttering "contemptuous words against
the President" and certain other public officials, was invoked for the
first time since 1951 in the 1965 court martial of Lt. Henry Howe for
carrying a sign critical of the President in an off-post peace rally while
in civilian clothes. 4 A sizable number of servicemen were courtmartialed for expressing opposition to the war in forms which are constitutionally protected in civilian society-such as passing out leaflets,"'
talking in a bull session," 6 or publishing a newspaper 7--under the
"general articles," Article 133138 forbidding "conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman" and Article 134' proscribing "disorders and
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline" and "conduct of
a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces."
The constitutional attack on these military offenses, first in the
military appeals courts and later on habeas corpus in the federal courts,
questioned the necessity for the military to use vague and overbroad
offenses, still phrased in eighteenth century terminology, in the changed
Kauffman v. Secretary of Air Force, 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Angle v. Laird,
429 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1970); cf. Gearinger v. United States, 412 F.2d 862 (Ct CI.
1969).
132. See, e.g., In re Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965) ; Ashe v. McNamara,
355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965).
133. 10 U.S.C. § 888 (1970).
134. United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967).
135. United States v. Amick, United States v. Stolte, 40 C.M.R. 720 (ABR 1969).
136. United States v. Harvey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 539, 42 C.M.R. 141 (1970); United
States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 42 C.M.R. 131 (1970).
137. United States v. Priest, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 564, 45 C.M.R. 338 (1972).
138. 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1970).
139. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970).
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conditions of the contemporary armed forces. The military courts
routinely rejected the claims of unconstitutional vagueness simply by
citing prior precedents and turned back first amendment free speech
arguments with conclusory statements that criticism of the military
or the war by servicemen undermines morale and discipline.1 4 However, a number of federal courts were willing to overcome traditional
judicial deference towards the military and to examine the military's
policy arguments. In 1972, the District of Columbia District Court, in
Stolte v. Laird,'' reversed the court-martial conviction of two soldiers
for passing out an anti-war leaflet on post, holding that the specification
under Article 133 under which they were charged (making "disloyal
statements") was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The court
said that it was not prepared to accept historical precedents and early
court-martial practices as justifying "the flaunting of modern and welldefined constitutional standards."' 4 2 It rejected the argument that
"every statement critical of a military program or policy can have an
effect on attitudes and morale, which can arguably affect in turn order
and discipline," stating that "[m] otivation is too intangible a concept to
suffice to meet the directness required for a prejudice to order to override the First Amendment."' 43 Finally, although the court observed
that political discussions by servicemen on the drill field or on duty were
not appropriate, it found that
in their off-duty hours, in barracks, "bull sessions," and even
in leaflets, they can express their views on political issues, so
long as they do not directly prejudice good order and discipline. While soldiers can be compelled to obey orders; they
cannot be compelled to an ideological orthodoxy prescribed
by their superior officers. 4
The army did not appeal the Stolte decision, and several .months
later, in an opinion written by retired Supreme Court Justice Tom
Clark, the District of Columbia Circuit held Article 134 unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in reviewing the court-martial conviction of a serviceman for handing out an antiwar leaflet." 5 Shortly
thereafter, the Third Circuit similarly held both Articles 133 and 134
140. See United States v. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 555, 558-59 (ABR 1966), 17 U.S.C.M.A.

165, 173-74, 37 C.M.R. 429, 437-38 (1967).

141. 353 F. Supp. 1392 (D.D.C. 1972).
142. Id. at 1406-07.

143. Id. at 1406.
144. Id. at 1403.
145. Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 477 F.2d 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
unconstitutional in reversing the conviction of Captain Howard Levy
for criticizing the war to other servicemen. 4 ' However, the victories
were short-lived; in the summer of 1974, the Supreme Court reversed
both decisions. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 5-3 majority in Parker
v. Levy, 4 ' found that there was sufficient elaboration in the Manual for
48 military cases,
Courts-Martial,'
and military custom to give a serviceman notice of what was criminal. Given the need of the military to
impose limitations on conduct different from those applicable in civilian
life, he found that a presumptive validity should be given to Congress'
use in the general articles of imprecise language which sweeps more
broadly than is permissible in civilian statutes. He conceded that there
might be marginal applications where the general articles would infringe on first amendment rights of servicemen, but held that Captain
Levy had -actually urged enlisted men to refuse to obey orders to combat
and that this was not protected free speech. Thus, it is possible that the
general articles may still be found unconstitutional in a case in which
the speech is protected by the first amendment.
It is instructive to note the sources on which the Levy opinion
relied for its generalizations about military life. In support of the
proposition that "the military is, by necessity, a specialized society
separate from civilian society," Justice Rehnquist relied on random
quotes from Supreme Court cases dating from 1890 to 1955.1 The
quote from the 1890 case read: "An army is not a deliberative body.
It is an executive arm. Its law is that of obedience. No question can be
left open as to the right to command in the officer, or the duty of
obedience in the soldier."' 50 Rehnquist then quoted at length from
cases dated 1857, 1886, 1893, and 1897 to show that "long-standing
customs and usages of the services impart accepted meaning to the
seemingly imprecise standards of Arts. 133 and 134.""' Finally, he
made the remarkable statement that the UCMJ "cannot be equated to
a civilian criminal code" since it regulates conduct unregulated in the
civilian sphere, concluding therefrom that it need not meet the same
procedural due process standards as to vagueness." 2 Thus he concluded
that the proper standard for review of a vagueness challenge to a military offense is not that applicable to normal criminal offenses, but to
criminal statutes regulating economic affairs in which, presumably
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973).
94 S. Ct. 2547 (1974).
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1969 (rev. ed.).
94 S. Ct. 2547, at 2555-56 (1974).
Id. at 2556, quoting from In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890).
Id. at 2557-58, 2557.
Id. at 2558.
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because the purpose is regulatory and the penalty often economic, the
and there is a strong
same high standard of definiteness is not required
153
notice.
of
sufficiency
of
presumptive validity
One need only to have read sparingly in contemporary literature
about the military to have doubts about these assumptions. The invocation of absolute obedience, if not laid to rest by Nuremberg' and
military cases which have upheld a serviceman's right to question orders
for clarification and to disobey them if illegal, 55 has been rejected in
contemporary military teaching. Military leadership doctrine now
favors persuasion over authoritarian domination and views the commander's objective as instilling high initiative and morale rather than
discipline.'
The proposals of the Military "Young Turks" (described
153.

The Supreme Court, however, has not been willing to diminish constitutional

due process rights in criminal proceedings in which the defendant, as in a court-martial,
can receive a jail sentence. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, at 37 (1972), holding that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by
counsel at his trial;" Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, at 326 (1971), holding that home
visitation by welfare workers was "a reasonable administrative tool" not violating the
fourth amendment, but distinguishing criminal cases in which the constitutional right
would apply.
154. The Fourth Principle of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment formulated by
the International Law Commission, 5 U.N. General Assembly Official Records, Supp. 12,
at 12, U.N. Doc. A/1313 (1950), reads: "The fact that a person acted pursuant to order
of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him." In the "Subsequent
Proceedings" war crimes trials conducted at Nuremberg by the United States under Control Council Law No. 10, superior order was raised and rejected as a defense to shooting
of hostages, United States v. List (the Hostages Case), XI Trials of War Criminals 7591326, and to extermination programs, United States v. Ohlendorf ("Einsatzgruppen
Case"), IV Trials of War Criminals 3-598. In the "Einsatzgruppen Case," the Tribunal
stated:
The obedience of a soldier is not the obedience of an automaton. A soldier is a
reasoning agent. He does not respond, and is not expected to respond, like a
piece of machinery. It is a fallacy of wide-spread consumption that a soldier
is required to do everything his superior officer orders him to do.
Id. at 470, quoted in United States v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742, 776 (AFBR 1953). See also
DEP'T OF THE ARmY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, FM 27-10 (1956), para. 509a:
The fact that the law of war has been violated pursuant to an order of a
superior authority, whether military or civil, does not deprive the act in question
of its character of a war crime, nor does it constitute a defense in the trial of
an accused individual, unless he did not know and could not reasonably have
been expected to know that the act ordered was unlawful.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Presley, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 474, 40 C.M.R. 188 (1969),
holding that response "in a negative way" of enlisted man to officers' orders to move out
of camp and engage Viet Cong units was, under the circumstances, "not an expression of
defiance of their authority, but an effort to obtain reconsideration and relief from their
respective orders;" United States v. Ashley, 8'C.M.R. 810 (ABR 1953), holding enlisted
man's remonstrance that he had a right to be in mess hall upon being ordered to leave by
an NCO was not disobedience since his actions in attempting to explain the situation were
not unreasonable.
156. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERsoN EL & THE
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, PROCEEDINGS FOR THE JUNIOR OFFICER LEADERSHIP
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in John Lovell's book review'5 7 ) for a pluralistic military and relaxed
standards of discipline in the "supporting" forces reflects a widelyshared feeling today that rigid discipline and obedience often undercut, rather than promote, morale and efficiency in the armed forces.
The tremendous changes in treatment of military personnel which
came in the late 1960's and early 1970's, involving higher pay, greater
recognition of individuality as in hair styles, provisions for greater
privacy in military quarters, and expanded resort to off-base housing,'
make references to nineteenth century military customs and usages of
doubtful relevance today. Greater diversity and pluralism among military personnel today make it especially difficult for all servicemen to
appreciate the meaning of vague offenses like "conduct unbecoming
an officer and a gentleman."
As far as the characterization of the military as an executive arm,
it has long been accepted that courts-martial perform judicial functions
and, although not article III courts, are bound by constitutional and
judicial policy restraints. 5 ' The military maintains that the UCMJ is
indeed the equivalent of a modern civil criminal code, offering servicemen equivalent procedural rights to those available in civilian courts.'
Military law contains some substantive offenses not found in civil
criminal codes, but civil codes also differ in substantive law from
state to state and, in fact, sometimes limit certain offenses to certain
groups, such as juveniles, state licensees, or homeowners. As Justice
Stewart observed in dissent,
[t]he question before us is not whether the military may
adopt substantive rules different from those that govern
civilian society, but whether the serviceman has the same right
as his civilian counterpart to be informed as to precisely what
conduct those rules proscribe before he can be criminally
WORKSHOP ON CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

(1972).

157.

Lovell, No Tunes of Glory: America's Military in the Aftermath of Vietnam,
49 IND. L.J. 698 (1974), infra.
158. See, e.g., The New Army: A Ft. Benning Brigade of Volunteers Indicates
Nixon Plan Will Work, Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1972, at 1, col. 1; Humanizing the U.S.
Military, TIME, Dec. 21, 1970, at 16.
159. See criticism of Winthrop's contention that a court-martial is "not a part of
the judiciary, but an agency of the executive department" as "illogical and fallacious" by
acting Judge Advocate General of the Army Samuel T. Ansell in Hearings on S. 5320
Before the Senate Comm. on Military Affairs, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. at 49 (1919). See also
United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967); United States v.
Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
160. See, e.g., Hodson, Courts-Martialand the Commander, 10 SAN DIEGo L. REv.
51 (1972); Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages over a
Civilian Defendant, 22 MAINE L. REV. 105 (1970).
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punished for violating them.16 '
Based upon "these very significant differences between military
law and civilian law and between the military community and the
civilian community," Justice Rehnquist not only approved a lower
standard of specificity and definiteness in military criminal offenses,
but concluded that there were "weighty countervailing policies" undercutting the usual broad doctrine of standing in first amendment cases." 2
Thus, he held that Levy, having 'clearly engaged in nonprotected
speech, had no standing to challenge the overbreadth of the articles as
applied in other contexts. Missing was any analysis of first amendment
policies or the causes of dissent in the military, such as are found in
Howard De Nike's article, which reflect legitimate concerns to which
free speech can provide valuable correctives in a democratic society.
Social science research should not be touted as an infallible guide
to the decision of military cases. As in most nonphysical sciences dependent upon imperfect research models and human judgments, the
evidence is often inconclusive and the conclusions conflicting. But assumptions like Justice Rehnquist's, based upon no more than a judge's
own predispositions buttressed by equally unverified quotations from
prior cases and historical analogies, seem particularly inadequate for
dealing with complex issues of control of the contemporary military
establishment.
A number of other features of the court-martial system have been
challenged in federal habeas corpus actions, most of them with little
success. Attacks upon the method of selection of the military jury
(the commander makes the selection from among his officers or, if
requested by the defendant, from at least one-third enlisted men, on the
basis of whom he believes is best qualified by reason of age, education,
training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament)"'
have not been successful, the courts continuing to find no sixth amendment right to trial by jury in a court-martial.'" A few commanders,
however, have been persuaded to use a method of random selection
which results in a largely enlisted-man jury, and social science and
statistical data have been used to show the practical feasibility and to
assuage commanders' fears of misuse." 5 Several federal courts have
161. 94 S. Ct. 2547, 2570 at 2577 (1974).
162. 94 S. Ct. 2547, at 2564, 2559-60.
163. 10 U.S.C. § 825 (1970).
164.
States v.
395 U.S.
165.

United States v. Kemp, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 152, 46 C.M.RI 152 (1973); United
Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964). Cf. O'Callahan v. Parker,
258, 261 (1969), discussed supra at note 107, at 261 (dictum).
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held that summary courts-martial (in which the summary court officer
serves as judge, jury, prosecutor, and defense counsel) violates servicemen's constitutional rights to due process and defense counsel, according
to the Supreme Court's decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin,' requiring
a lawyer as defense counsel whenever a defendant could receive a
sentence of confinement.'67 Thereafter the Army and Navy changed
their procedures to require lawyer defense counsel in summary courts
where confinement could be given."6 " However, suits challenging the
continued refusal of the Navy and Marine Corps to provide lawyer
counsel have resulted in conflicting decisions among the lower courts.""
c. Military Personnel Actions
Despite the doctrine that habeas corpus was the only vehicle for
obtaining review of military determinations, various federal remedies
have gradually been applied in the military context, and there are now
limited categories in which collateral review is possible.'
The Vietnam
war resulted in a flood of suits in federal courts seeking judicial relief
from military personnel actions claimed to be illegal, unconstitutional,
arbitrary, or unjust. They challenged inductions and activations; orders
to Vietnam and transfers to other posts; refusals to discharge for
medical or other reasons; pending courts-martial and less-than-honorable discharges; methods of training and discipline; and refusals to
permit meetings, distribution of literature, and other exercises of free
speech.'' Early in the war, the courts generally dismissed such suits,
quoting from a 1953 Supreme Court decision which denied review of
a serviceman's assignment with the blunt words, "[j]udges are not
given the task of running the army.'

72

Post, Apr. 12, 1974, § C, at 1, col. 1; The Young Peers of Long Binh, TIME, Nov. 8,
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168. See Directive of Army Judge Advocate General DAJA-MJ 1972/12338; Daigle
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The first substantial break in this nonreviewability doctrine had occurred in suits by ex-servicemen challenging less-than-honorable discharges. In the 1958 case of Harmon v. Brucker,'17 the Supreme Court
held that the Secretary of the Army had exceeded his authority in giving
a serviceman with a good record an undesirable discharge because of
allegedly subversive activities before his induction and ordered that an
honorable discharge be issued. Since then, federal courts have extended
their review to less-than-honorable discharges where servicemen were
not accorded proper procedural rights under military regulations or
the Constitution. 1 74 In a particularly galling case for the military, a
federal court ruled in 1970 that allegations that Private Andy Stapp
(founder of the American Servicemen's Union and vigorous critic of
the military) had close associations with members of the Communist
Party and was a member of the Workers World Party were insufficient
grounds for an undesirable discharge since they did not indicate mis1 75
conduct in the performance of his military duties.
These precedents were significantly expanded in the Vietnam War
when federal court review was extended for the first time to servicemen who claimed that they were entitled to be discharged. Such cases
involve considerably more interference with the day-to-day operations
of the military than did the cases involving review of court-martial
convictions and less-than-honorable discharges, since here the courts are
asked to overturn military decisions that men should not be discharged,
thus directly affecting military manpower levels.
The type of case to which the courts were first willing to extend
review involved servicemen who had been refused discharge as conscientious objectors. In 1967, Charles A. Hammond, who had enlisted
in the U.S. Naval Reserve four years before when he was 17 years old,
submitted a request for a CO discharge, stating that he had become a
member of the Society of Friends and could no longer participate in
good conscience in war in any form. His request for discharge was
refused by the Chief of Naval Personnel, and when he failed to attend
reserve drills, he was ordered to report for two years active duty. He
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the U.S. District Court
for Connecticut, claiming that there was no "basis in fact" for the
military's finding that he was not entitled to discharge as a conscien173. 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (per curiam).
174. See Kennedy v. Secretary of the Navy, 401 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ; Bland
v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Davis v. Stahr, 293 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir.

1961).
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tious objector, thus depriving him of his rights to due process and
equal protection of the laws under the Constitution. The district court
dismissed, but the Second Circuit held that federal court review of a
refusal of the military to discharge a serviceman was appropriate."'
The impact of the Hammond decision was immediate and dramatic.
Four other U.S. Circuit Courts accepted its position in short order,'77
and federal district courts around the country began ordering servicemen to be discharged when they found no basis in fact for the military's refusal to discharge them as CO's. Some courts extended review
to other situations in which military regulations provide for discharge,
ordering the discharge of servicemen who claim they should have been
discharged because of medical or psychiatric disqualifications, dependency of others upon them, and personal hardship.178
The federal courts also expanded review during the Vietnam War
to cases in which servicemen claimed they had been improperly inducted
or drafted, or, in the case of reservists, improperly activated. Many
individuals were ordered discharged because their draft boards failed
to follow regulations, violated their constitutional rights in the process
of classifying and inducting them, or denied them a deferment without
good reason.' 79 Despite the hostility of many district courts towards
challenges to selective service procedures, draft boards were increasingly
found to have engaged in improper or shoddy practices. By the
latter part of the war, it was not uncommon for a number of individuals
in each group reporting for induction to have their attorneys 6imultaneously filing writs of habeas corpus for their discharge in the local
federal court and for basic training classes to be substantially reduced
by court-ordered discharges. This was one of the most extraordinary
phenomena of the war, as the federal courts played a key role in reviewing, and ultimately in making almost unenforceable, the selective
service system as it was then constituted. It is one of the best examples
of increased judicial control of one phase of the military establishment
in response to public opposition to the draft and heavy resort to litiga176. Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968).
177. United States ex rel. Sheldon v. O'Malley, 420 F.2d 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Bates v. Commander, 413 F.2d 475 (1st Cir. 1969) ; United States ex rel. Brooks v. Clifford, 409 F.2d 700, petition for rehearing denied, 412 F.2d 1137 (4th Cir. 1969) ; In re
Kelly, 401 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1968) (dictum).
178. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kempf v. Commanding Officer, 339 F. Supp. 320
(S.D. Iowa 1972) ; Townley v. Resor, 323 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Cal. 1970). But see Silverthorne v. Laird, 460 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1972).
179. See, e.g., Lewis v. Secretary of the Army, 402 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1968);
Powers v. Powers, 400 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1968) ; United States ex rel. Wilkerson v. Commanding Officer, 286 F. Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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tion by draftees. The demise of the draft as a result of Congress'
move to a volunteer army was certainly due in part to the federal
courts.
The final critical jump was for federal courts to grant review of
military rules, practices, and conduct which were arbitrary or resulted
in denial of constitutional rights. The cases prior to the Vietnam War
were crystal clear that courts should not get involved in such matters.
However, the deprivation of rights in some cases was simply too
great for courts to go on ignoring what the military did, and there was
a modest break away from this rule during the Vietnam War. Federal
courts began to grant review in cases where it was shown that the
military had failed to follow its own regulations,' that its conduct
constituted a gross abuse of discretion,'"' or that constitutional rights
were violated. 2 A serviceman who claimed that he had been assigned
to duties for which he was not medically qualified obtained a court
order that he be given a job which would not require stooping or
prolonged standing.'
The transfer of a serviceman to Vietnam was
cancelled by a court where the military had failed to consider that the
health of his son would be adversely affected.8 4 Servicemen who had
been reassigned to other bases or to Vietnam on account of their antiwar activities were able to obtain restraining orders preventing their
transfer pending determination of their cases on the merits (they were
generally unsuccessful on the merits)."5

Some courts, however, have continued to follow a strict nonreviewability rule as to duty assignments. A suit brought by a serviceman
who claimed he had received orders to Vietnam because of making
antiwar statements to a newspaper reporter was dismissed, the court
stating that duty assignments of one properly inducted were not reviewable.' 0 The Second Circuit, in a suit by a member of the army
band at Ft. Wadsworth, New York, who received orders to Texas after
he and other band members signed a petition calling for immediate
180. Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Feliciano v. Laird, 426 F.2d
424 (2d Cir. 1970); Clark v. Brown, 414 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Smith v. Resor,
406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969).
181. Schatten v. United States, 419 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1969) ; United States ex rel.
Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1968).
182. United States v. Flower, 452 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1971), reV'd, 407 U.S. 197
(1972) ; Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965) ; Committee for G.I. Rights v.
Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934 (D.D.C. 1974); Stolte v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 1392 (D.D.C.
1972).
183. Patterson v. Commanding Officer, 321 F. Supp. 1080 (W.D. La. 1971).
184. Bluth v. Laird, 435 F.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1970).
185. In re Brown v. Brown, 3 SSLR 3404 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
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withdrawal from Vietnam and after some of their fiancees and wives
had attempted to march with the band carrying antiwar signs in a 4th
of July parade, held that judicial review of duty assignments was appropriate only where there is a strong case that the military has exceeded
its authority or violated first amendment rights." 7 It observed that his
transfer may have been justified to avoid disorder or a repeat of the
4th of July incident. In a suit by reservists who objected to orders to
march in a V.F.W. parade three months before the 1972 election,
brought on the grounds that it was a partisan political demonstration,
relief was denied; the judge stated that orders to march in holiday
parades are legal. 8 ' Courts have been especially hesitant to review
cases involving military personnel problems not related to civil rights.
A court dismissed a suit by an officer who claimed he had been discriminated against by the commander's failure to inflate ratings as
other commanders did, causing him to be denied a promotion.8 9 In
a highly publicized case, Captain Marcus Arnheiter challenged his
removal from the command of a destroyer escort ship as discriminatory.'
The court refused relief on the grounds that the record showed
that his removal was an internal, administrative matter involving the
judgnent of a military commander.
Suits by servicemen claiming violations of their rights to free
speech have been among the most difficult cases for courts during the
Vietnam War because they involved highly controversial matters and
conduct which the military viewed as a serious threat to the armed
forces. Courts were occasionally willing to step in to prevent flagrant
violations of rights. For example, in 1969, the Fourth Circuit found
that black soldiers who had organized an antiwar group at Ft. Jackson
(known as the "Ft. Jackson 8") were being improperly confined in
the stockade pending court-martial on account of their antiwar views
and ordered them released (the court-martial charges, based on their
attempts to hold a meeting to discuss the war, were later dropped after
adverse publicity and pressure from black Congressmen).'

However,

courts were generally unwilling to interfere with limitations on antiwar
dissent through restrictive regulations and threats of courts-martial
while the war was still on. Suits during the war challenging military
187. Cortright v. Resor, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965
(1972) ; see generally Note, Judicial Review and Military Discipline-Cortrightv. Resor:
The Case of the Boys in the Band, 72 COLUm. L. REv. 1048 (1972).
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regulations forbidding distribution of literature on-post without prior
approval of the commander, public meetings on post to discuss political
issues, participation in off-post demonstrations in uniform, and wearing
of hair beyond required lengths were unsuccessful."9 2
After the war was ended, two federal courts struck down military
regulations giving commanders broad powers to forbid distribution of
written materials on post without prior authorization. 9 These decisions
followed earlier precedents requiring the military to permit civilians
to enter "open military posts" and engage in reasonable first amendment
activity. In 1970, the Seventh Circuit held that a civilian employee of
the army could not be excluded from the post because she had distributed antiwar literature there."" In two significant cases in 1972, the
federal courts ruled that opponents of the ,war and antiwar presidential candidates (one was Dr. Benjamin Spock) could not be prevented from distributing literature and from campaigning on military
bases which are generally open to the public.9 Thus, although the
courts failed to respond to challenges to military surveillance and intelligence activities in the political sphere, they did open up the military environment itself to limited political activity.
One of the strongest post-war cases demonstrating the expanded
role of federal courts in overseeing the military's personnel practices
arose out of the drug abuse program instituted by the army in 1973
in Europe described in Howard De Nike's article. Designed to identify
drug pushers and users, provide users with medical assistance, counselling, and rehabilitation, and eliminate confirflied users from the service,
the program sanctioned mandatory inspections of soldiers' rooms property, clothing, and bodies for drugs or indications of drug use.'
A
group of soldiers sued in the District of Columbia federal court, and
judge Gerhard Gesell found a number of the practices unconstitutional :'17
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964 (E.D.N.C. 1972); Dash v. Commanding General, 307 F. Supp. 849 (D.S.C. 1969),
aff'd, 429 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1970) ; Schneider v. Laird, 453 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1972) ;
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The special drug inspections authorized without probable
cause are made in a most intrusive manner solely to ferret out
drugs and are not analogous to the Army's traditional preparedness inspections .

.

.

. Such distinguishing features

as the use of dogs, strip skin examinations and detailed intrusion into a soldier's personal effects take this procedure out
of the narrow exemption from traditional Fourth Amendment restrictions that has been carved out for legitimate
inspections.
He rejected the military's defense of "military necessity," stating that
it "does not embrace everything the military may consider desirable"
and concluded that although the drug problem was serious, it was not
of "epidemic proportions" such as to warrant ignoring constitutional
safeguards." 8
Conclusion
Despite their reluctance, federal courts have become an increasingly
significant force for controlling the military. The mammoth test case
litigation challenging the legality of the Vietnam War met with little
success in the courtroom, but reduced the previous intractability of
the judiciary towards review of such issues and established a new
public credence in the efficacy of constitutional litigation for resolving
such momentous issues. The expanded willingness of federal courts to
provide remedies for violations of rights of servicemen introduces a
new factor into military personnel policies. Federal judges who ten
years ago had virtually no contact with the military establishment are
now used to dealing with requests for temporary restraining orders
and injunctions to prevent reassignments, discharges, disciplinary actions, and courts-martial, raising diverse issues of constitutional and
administrative law. Prediction of the demise of the nonreviewability
doctrine would be premature, and recent standing and political question cases indicate continued doctrinal restraints upon judicial review
in the military context. Nevertheless, it seems clear that there has been
a lessening of both individual and doctrinal reluctance in the judiciary
to interfere with military actions. This is a healthy development, offering both greater protection for individuals against arbitrariness and
injustice within the military and a needed check upon the operations
and role of the military in our democratic society.
198. Id. at 940.

